Critical Security Issues
1. JWT Signature Verification Disabled
CRITICALDescription
The application disables JWT signature verification in multiple authentication functions, allowing attackers to forge authentication tokens and impersonate any user.
Location
backend/utils/auth_utils.py (lines 89, 156, 189)
backend/user_profiles/api.py (multiple locations)
Vulnerable Code
payload = jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})
Impact
- Attackers can create valid-looking JWT tokens without knowing the secret key
- Complete authentication bypass - any user can impersonate any other user
- Unauthorized access to all user data and administrative functions
- Potential for complete system compromise
Remediation
- Enable JWT signature verification immediately:
# Replace all instances with proper verification payload = jwt.decode( token, config.SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET, algorithms=["HS256"], options={"verify_signature": True} )
- Ensure the JWT secret key is properly configured in environment variables
- Implement proper error handling for invalid tokens
- Add logging for failed authentication attempts
- Consider implementing token rotation and expiration policies
2. Missing Critical Security Headers
CRITICALDescription
The application does not implement essential HTTP security headers, leaving it vulnerable to various client-side attacks including XSS, clickjacking, and MIME-type sniffing attacks.
Missing Headers
- Content-Security-Policy: No CSP header to prevent XSS attacks
- X-Frame-Options: Application can be embedded in iframes (clickjacking risk)
- X-Content-Type-Options: Browser can perform MIME-type sniffing
- Strict-Transport-Security: No HSTS to enforce HTTPS
- Referrer-Policy: Sensitive information may leak via referrer
Impact
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks can execute malicious scripts
- Clickjacking attacks can trick users into performing unintended actions
- Man-in-the-middle attacks possible without HSTS
- Information disclosure through referrer leakage
Remediation
- Add security headers middleware to FastAPI:
@app.middleware("http") async def add_security_headers(request: Request, call_next): response = await call_next(request) response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY" response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff" response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://unpkg.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';" response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" response.headers["Permissions-Policy"] = "geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()" return response
- Configure Next.js security headers in
next.config.ts - Test headers using security scanning tools
- Regularly review and update CSP policies
3. Exposed GitHub Personal Access Token
CRITICALDescription
A GitHub personal access token (classic) was shared in the audit request and is potentially exposed in the codebase or documentation.
Exposed Token
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
Impact
- Unauthorized access to private GitHub repositories
- Ability to modify code, create releases, and manage repository settings
- Potential for supply chain attacks through code injection
- Access to sensitive intellectual property and business logic
- Possible lateral movement to other connected services
Remediation
- IMMEDIATELY revoke the exposed token:
- Go to GitHub Settings → Developer settings → Personal access tokens
- Delete the token
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
- Generate a new token with minimal required permissions
- Store the new token securely in environment variables or secrets management
- Scan the entire codebase for any hardcoded secrets using tools like:
git-secretstruffleHoggitleaks
- Implement pre-commit hooks to prevent future secret exposure
- Review GitHub audit logs for any unauthorized access
- Consider using GitHub Apps instead of personal access tokens for better security